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Since the early 1990s, NAIRU estimates have declined and unemployment 
duration has risen relative to the unemployment rate.  These developments may have 
arisen from the aging of the workforce or practices reducing job turnover.  We assess the 
internal consistency of these hypotheses using simulation methods and test their external 
consistency using modified NAIRU models. We find that demographics cannot fully 
account for changes in the NAIRU, consistent with Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001) 
and in contrast to Shimer (1998, 2001). Instead, our results attribute shifts in the NAIRU 
and duration to a combination of shifts in demographics and job turnover. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This study assesses whether an apparent decline in the NAIRU since the early 
1990s is attributable to changes in U.S. labor practices and demographic factors that are 
reflected  in  a  concomitant  rise  in  average  unemployment  duration  relative  to  the 
unemployment  rate.    In  this  period,  the  U.S.  unemployment  rate  fluctuated  in  a  low 
range,  with  inflation  below  what  prior  experience  suggested,  sparking  a  renewed 
recognition that the “natural” rate of unemployment is not precisely known and is subject 
to shifts.  Although this phenomenon has been well documented (e.g., Staiger, Stock, and 
Watson, 1997, and Gordon, 1997), there has been less progress in accounting for the drop 
in the NAIRU.  While demographic changes have played a role (Abraham and Shimer, 
2001), they cannot fully account for the decline (Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 2001). 
Demographics  also  cannot  largely  explain  the  rise  in  the  ratio  of  the  average 
duration of unemployment to the unemployment rate, which has increased more since the 
late 1990s than what prior experience would suggest based on swings in the share of the 
labor force under the age of 35 (Figure 1).   
This study argues that both of these phenomena may have resulted from a fall in 
the  rate  of  job  turnover.  A  decrease  in  job  turnover  means  that  there  are  fewer  job 
vacancies at a given unemployment rate, implying that the hiring rate is lower at each 
unemployment rate. Thus, a fall in the hiring rate results in an increase in the ratio of 
average duration to unemployment. In addition, if firms pay efficiency wages, a fall in 
the hiring rate at each unemployment rate implies that the profit-maximizing wage is 
lower, resulting in a lower equilibrium unemployment rate for the economy.     
Shimer (2005) presents evidence that there has been a decrease in job separation 
since the early 1990’s. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason for a fall in job  
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turnover, there are several plausible explanations for this decrease. One possible reason is 
that the downsizing that occurred during the 1990-91 recession and its aftermath caused 
workers to perceive a lower degree of job security. Workers who are more worried about 
layoffs may be less likely to change jobs, since they may be uncertain about the quality of 
the match with their new employer and since the first workers to be laid off are often the 
ones most recently hired. Consistent with this explanation, surveys of workers at large 
firms conducted by International Survey Research show that the share of workers worried 
about their job security has generally been higher since the late 1980s (Figure 2). A 
second  possible  reason  for  a  fall  in  the  separation  rate  is  that  women’s  labor  force 
attachment  has  increased,  as  suggested  by  Abraham  and  Shimer  (2001).  A  third 
explanation is that selection problems in obtaining health benefits at a  new job have 
become more significant as real health care costs have risen.  This, in turn, may have 
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We use two approaches to analyze the validity and plausibility of the hypothesis 
that the fall in the natural rate and the rise in the duration-unemployment ratio are related 
to a decline in the rate of job turnover.  First, we assess whether changing labor practices 
and demographics can account for a falling NAIRU and rising duration-to-unemployment 
ratio using an efficiency wage framework. Second, we add the duration-to-unemployment 
rate ratio to NAIRU models to see if this labor gauge adds marginal information in the 
presence of the overall or demographically-adjusted unemployment rate. The rationale 
for including the duration-unemployment ratio is that changes in job turnover at a given 
unemployment rate would be reflected in movements in this ratio and changes in job 
turnover at each unemployment rate affect the NAIRU. Thus, the unemployment-duration 
ratio serves as a proxy for the job turnover rate (holding the unemployment rate constant) 
and should add marginal information in estimating the NAIRU.   
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A related motivation for including the duration-unemployment ratio in Phillips 
curve equations is that, in efficiency wage models, the inflation rate may be related to the 
probability  of  finding  a  job.  While  the  unemployment  rate  affects  the  probability  of 
finding  a  job,  it  is  not  the  sole  determinant.  The  duration-unemployment  ratio  adds 
marginal information about the probability of finding a job and thus may add marginal 
information in predicting the inflation rate. Adding the unemployment-duration rate to 
NAIRU models also allows us to estimate how the NAIRU has evolved.  In essence, we 
test  the  internal  consistency  of  our  hypothesis  by  using  simulation  methods  in  an 
efficiency  wage  model,  while  also  checking  its  external  consistency  using  regression 
analysis.  
Results  from  both  approaches  support  the  view  that  labor  markets  have  been 
affected at a macro level by both a decreased likelihood of worker-initiated job turnover 
and a shift toward a more experienced labor force pool.  To establish these findings, 
section II presents an efficiency wage model and discusses the results of simulating shifts 
in labor practices and labor force composition.  As a check on external consistency and to 
assess  using  an  additional  measure  of  overall  labor  slack,  the  third  section  augments 
NAIRU models with data on demographics and the duration of unemployment.  Our last 
section concludes by summarizing and interpreting our findings. 
 




This subsection describes the model used to analyze changes over time in the 
natural rate of unemployment and the duration-unemployment ratio. It is assumed that 
there are two classes of workers, where type 1 workers are older (age 35 and over) and 
type 2 are younger.  We denote the number of each type as LF1 and LF2 and employment  
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of each type as  1 L  and  2 L .  Note that we could distinguish among workers using other 
criteria, such as white- versus blue-collar occupations, or males versus females. Thus, the 
model has the flexibility to analyze different types of issues related to the natural rate and 
duration of unemployment.  
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where Wi is the wage the firm pays,  i W  is the economywide average wage rate for type i 
workers, and h is the probability of an unemployed worker being hired in a given period. 
It is assumed that the probability of hire depends negatively on the unemployment rate 
(ui) and positively on the rate of separation into unemployment (qi), where the latter 
reflects that there are more job openings when the separation rate is higher.
1 
  The  probability  of  hire  can  be  calculated  as  follows.  The  number  of  type  i 
unemployed workers at the beginning of a period (NUBi) equals the number unemployed 
in the prior period plus separations at the end of the prior period. Thus,  
      NUB￿￿  1 , 1 , 1 , - - - + = t i i t i t i L q LF u  
          1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ) 1 ( - - - - - + = t i t i i t i t i LF u q LF u . 
 
  It  is  assumed  that  outflows  from  the  pool  of  the  unemployed  (OPUi)  equal 
separations in the previous period (since these workers need to be replaced). Accordingly, 
outflows are 
    OPUi,t  1 , - = t i iL s a 1 , 1 , ) 1 ( - - - = t i t i i LF u s a ,  
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where si is the proportion of workers who separate either into unemployment or out of the 
labor force,
2 and a is the proportion of vacancies that are filled by individuals in the pool 
of the unemployed (as opposed to individuals who are not in the labor force). If it is 
assumed that a fraction, b, of separations are into unemployment (as opposed to out of 
the labor force), then qi=bsi. This relationship allows OPU to be expressed as 
    OPUi,t  =  1 , 1 , ) 1 ( ) / ( - - - t i t i i LF u q b a . 
Thus, the probability of an unemployed worker of type i being hired in a given 
period is  
1 , 1 ,
1 ,
) 1 (
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A firm’s output (Q) depends on the quantity of each type of labor employed, with 
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The profits of a typical firm are given by the equation, 
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Differentiating (3) with respect to the employment of type i workers and the wages of 
type i workers and setting the derivatives equal to 0 yields  
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By substituting (5) into (4), we obtain the following equation, which is analogous 
to the Solow (1979) condition: 
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The  effect  of  the  separation  rate  on  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  can  be 
calculated by setting  i i W W /  equal to 1 (since  i i W W =  in a steady-state equilibrium), and 
totally differentiating (6). Thus,  
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yielding the following relationship: 










From equation (2), the values of hq and hu are 
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  The  average  duration  of  unemployment  can  be  calculated  as  follows.  Let  Zi 
denote the number of workers of type i. In each period, the number of type i workers who 



















and the total number of periods these workers have been unemployed is 
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The average duration of unemployment depends on both q and u. Differentiating (8) with 
respect to these variables yields  
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Thus, the average duration of unemployment depends positively on u and negatively on 
q. Note that a change in q directly affects D as expressed in (9), and it also indirectly  
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affects D through its effect on u. To find the total effect of q on D, we substitute (7) into 
(9), which yields 
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Thus, the indirect effect of q on D exactly offsets the direct effect, so that the total effect 
is 0.  
At the aggregate level, the average duration of unemployment is 
 
  2 2 1 1 D p D p D + = ,  
 
 
where pi is the share of workers of type i among the unemployed.  
 
Calibration 
  The model was calibrated with U.S. data from 1960-1970, and simulations were 
run over 1960-2005. As previously discussed, it is assumed that type 1 workers are age 
35 and over and that type 2 workers are younger than age 35. This section discusses how 
parameters for the simulations were determined. 
In the initial calibration, it is assumed that 61.3% of workers are type 1 and 38.7% 
of workers are type 2, in line with the age composition of the workforce over 1960-70. 
The unemployment rate is calibrated to match the average value of the natural rate of 
unemployment estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) over 1960-1970. In 
this period, the actual unemployment rate averaged 3.3% for older workers and 7.2% for 
younger workers. However, the actual average unemployment rate was below the CBO’s 
average NAIRU estimate. To make the simulated unemployment rate compatible with the  
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CBO’s average NAIRU estimate, the unemployment rates for the separate age groups are 
set at 3.89% and 8.49% in calibrating the model.    
It is assumed that q differs across the two types of workers, with this variable 
higher  for  younger  workers  than  for  older  workers,  in  line  with  evidence  from  Hall 
(1982) and Blanchard and Diamond (1990). To determine baseline values of q for each 
group of workers, we make use of the facts that the ratio of duration to unemployment 
averaged 2.75 over the 1960-70 period and that the average unemployment duration was 
1.5 times longer for older workers than for younger workers. These conditions result in 
values  of  q1=0.00195  per  week  (which  corresponds  to  a  monthly  separation  rate  of 
0.00845) and q2=0.00686 per week (which corresponds to a monthly separation rate of 
0.0295).




  After determining baseline values for u and q for each group of workers from the 
initial  calibration,  simulations  were  run  with  annual  data  from  1960-2005.  In  these 
simulations, the proportion of workers in each age category was determined from the 
actual  percentage  in  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  data.  In  addition,  within  each  broad 
category, the values of q1 and q2 were allowed to vary over time, depending on the age 
and gender composition of each broad age group. Among workers 35 and older, data 
from Blanchard and Diamond (1990) indicate that separations are 2.14 times higher for 
males than for females. Accordingly, q1 varies with the proportion of workers over 35 
who are male. In addition, data from Blanchard and Diamond (1990) show that, relative 
to males between the ages of 25 and 34, separations are 4.27 times higher for males 
between ages 16 and 24, 4.58 times higher for females between ages 16 and 24, and 2.48  
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times higher for females between ages 25 and 34. Thus, the value of q2 was adjusted to 
account for the proportion of young workers who fall into each of these subcategories. 
  For each group of workers (i.e., older and younger), the unemployment rate in 
each year was calculated by subtracting the value of q in that year from the baseline value 
of q. Then, this difference is multiplied by the value of du/dq from equation 7, and the 
product is added to the baseline value of the unemployment rate. However, as previously 
discussed,  changes  in  q  within  an  age  group  do  not  affect  the  average  duration  of 
unemployment for that age group. 
Table 1 reports the results of a simulation in which the values of q1 and q2 are 
determined solely by the demographic variables (i.e., the age and gender composition of 
the workforce). This table lists the simulated values of duration, the natural rate, and the 
ratio between duration and unemployment, along with the actual ratio and the CBO’s 
estimates of the NAIRU. Figure 3 plots the actual ratio of duration to the unemployment 
rate with the demographically simulated ratio over the sample period, and Figure 4 shows 
the  simulated  and  CBO-estimated  natural  rates.  Between  1960  and  1991,  the 
demographic simulation does a very good job of predicting the natural rate and does a 
reasonably good job of predicting the duration-unemployment ratio. However, while the 
simulated data match actual data reasonably well between 1960 and 1991, after 1991 the 
demographic-simulation model substantially under-predicts the duration-unemployment 
ratio and substantially over-predicts the CBO’s natural rate.  
A plausible explanation for the rise in the duration-unemployment ratio and the 
fall in the natural rate is that there was a decline in the separation rate after 1991, as 
reflected in Shimer’s (2005) estimates of the rate of job separation.
5 Between 1960 and 
1990, the demographically-based simulation of q does a reasonably good job of   
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Figure 3: Demographics Alone Cannot Account for the Relative Rise 
of Duration to the Unemployment Rate
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Figure 4: Demographics Alone Cannot Track the Decline in CBO's 
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matching Shimer’s estimates of the actual separation rate.  For example, from 1960-70, 
the simulated value of q rose 13% and Shimer’s estimates, by 11%.  Between 1970 and 
1980, the simulated value rose 10% and Shimer’s estimate increased 12%. Then, from 
1980-90,  the  simulated  value  declined  by  8%  and  Shimer’s  estimate  fell  by  13%.  
However, between 1991 and 1997, Shimer’s estimate of the separation rate fell much 
more (-16.5%) than the demographically-based simulated value (-4%).  These patterns 
suggest that factors other than demographics lowered the separation rate in the 1990s.  
To examine the effects of these changes on the duration-unemployment ratio and 
the natural rate of unemployment, it is assumed that the separation rate falls 2% a year 
between 1992 and 1997, in addition to changes stemming from demographics. Thus, the 
separation rate in 1997 is assumed to be 12% lower than it otherwise would have been. 
Table 2 shows how simulation results are altered when q is adjusted in this way. Based 
on simulations incorporating demographic changes and the above shift in the separation 
function,  Figures  5  and  6  plot,  respectively,  the  simulated  and  actual  duration- 
unemployment ratios and the simulated and the CBO natural rates. As illustrated by these 
figures, simulations of the ratio and NAIRU much more closely track the actual ratio and 
natural  rate  from  1992-2005  when  simulations  reflect  both  demographic  factors  and 
plausible shifts in the separation function, rather than demographic factors alone. 
A more recent rise in the duration-unemployment ratio since 2004 is consistent 
with the view that increased outsourcing and globalization may have more recently  
increased job insecurity, suggesting that another shift in the separation function may be 
occurring. Nevertheless, this study does not try to pinpoint the precise source of shifts in 
separation practices, nor do the techniques employed lend themselves to doing so.  
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Figure 5: Demographics and Shifts in Turnover Behavior Track the 
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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations.
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Figure 6: Demographics and Shifts in Turnover
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III. The Estimated Impact of Higher, Relative Duration on Inflation 
The  simulation  results  presented  earlier  illustrate  how  the  combination  of  the 
aging  of  the  labor  force  and  a  shift  in  hiring  and  firing  practices  could  provide  an 
internally consistent explanation for the behavior of the natural rate and average duration 
of unemployment.  To complement these findings, we assess whether our hypothesis is 
externally consistent using more traditional estimation techniques.  In particular, we test 
whether the ratio of duration to the unemployment rate adds marginal information to 
expectations-augmented Phillips Curve or NAIRU models, and how the inclusion of the 
duration ratio affects the NAIRU estimates and overall performance of this framework.   
Specification and Variables 
  According to the NAIRU framework popularized by Gordon (1977) and based on 
insights from Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967, 1968), inflation can be modeled as: 
) ( ) ( 1 0 t t t t t U U E - + =
*
- g p a p ,              (5) 
where  E  is  the  expectations  operator,  a0  is  constrained  to  equal  1,  U  is  the  civilian 
unemployment rate, and U* is the NAIRU.  In practice, an energy price shock term is 
added to control for the effect of supply shocks on the NAIRU and empirical proxies 
(usually lagged inflation or survey data on expectations) are used to control for inflation 
expectations. Although U* is not directly observed, if a constant is added the NAIRU can 
be estimated from the following baseline model, which largely follows Fuhrer (1995):   
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where p = inflation measured by the core PCE deflator, most variables are lagged to 
avoid simultaneity bias, ENERGY is the 8-quarter growth rate of the ratio of PCE energy 
prices  to  the  core  PCE  index,  and  NIXON  and NIXOFF  are  the  dummy  variables  to 
control for the effects of imposing and lifting the wage-price controls during the Nixon 
administration.
6 For internal consistency, the NAIRU specification constrains the sum of 
coefficients on lagged inflation to equal 1 since these lags jointly proxy for expected 
inflation. In equilibrium, inflation equals its expectation, implying that 1 0 / * b b - = U .  
Owing  to  biases  in  measuring  inflation  with  the  CPI  (see  Boskin,  et.  al.,  1996)  and 
measurement changes to the CPI that make it inconsistent over time (see p. 94, Council 
of Economic Advisors, 1999), core inflation is measured with the PCE deflator.
7 One 
minor difference from Fuhrer’s specification is that eq. (6) omits the lagged change in the 
unemployment rate which tracks speed effects (changes in unemployment) because this 
variable is very insignificant in core PCE and wage inflation models, in contrast to core 
CPI models. A second difference is that the t-1 lag of the 8-quarter percent change in 
relative PCE energy prices (ENERGY) is used instead of the time t percent change in the 
PPI  price  of  oil  relative  to  the  PPI  used  by  Fuhrer,  because  the  latter  is  highly 
insignificant.  The longer period over which relative energy price changes is measured 
allows  for  longer  pass-through  effects  and  the  t-1  lag  avoids  simultaneity  concerns.  
Another minor difference is the inclusion of the t-2 lag of the 8-quarter growth rate of the 
real value of the dollar (￿RER8Qt-2) as measured by the Federal Reserve Board’s broadly 
defined weighted average series.  The t-2 lag of this term fit better than the t or t-1 lags, 
likely reflecting delays in the pass through of exchange rate changes to retail prices.   
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The wage inflation specification models nominal wage inflation in the nonfarm 
business sector (p
w), and is similar to eq. (6) except that it includes lags of inflation 
measured with the implicit price deflator for non-farm business prices (
nf
t p ) rather than 
core  inflation  and,  to  control  for  normal  real  wage  increases,  includes  non-farm 
productivity growth over the prior 12 quarters (PROD12)
8:  
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  Eq.  (7)  also  includes  a  variable  (PROFSHAR)  to  control  for  large  swings  in 
compensation  surrounding  the  exercise  of  previously  earned  stock  options  which  can 
cause large and hard to predict swings in compensation growth.  Because stock options 
are only tracked by the compensation series when exercised rather than when earned, 
controlling  for  these  large  swings  is  needed  to  avoid  serial  correlation  and 
misspecification  problems.  For  example,  measured  compensation  growth  surged  in 
2000:q1 because employees exercised many stock options near the stock market peak and 
compensation  growth  became  negative  in  the  following  quarter.  To  control  for  large 
swings, PROFSHAR is defined to equal the gap between compensation growth and ECI 
private worker compensation growth, when the gap is at least 0.5 percent at a quarterly 
rate, and 0 otherwise.  (The ECI series does not yet include the value of stock options 
either when earned or exercised.)  Prior to the late 1990s, there are very few instances, 
reflecting that stock options are a relatively new phenomenon. Values of PROFSHAR are  
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set equal to 0 before 1980:2 because the ECI data start in 1980:1 and this period was 
likely unaffected by stock option payments to any noticeable extent. 
To assess whether duration adds marginal information, the ratio of duration to the 
unemployment rate is added to the baseline models in (6) and (7): 
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where X is a vector that can contain duration and/or demographic variables and b4 can be 
a row vector of more than one column when duration and demographic variables are 
included.  In this case, the NAIRU is not a constant and U* = -(b0+ b4Xt-1)/b1.     
     Two considerations about the form of the variable (DURRAT) are noteworthy. 
First,  a  ratio  is  used  to  help  identify  the  extra  information  in  duration  because  the 
unemployment rate and the average duration of unemployment are collinear.  Second, 
duration tends to lag the unemployment rate by two quarters, which makes intuitive sense 
since  unemployment  usually  rises  first  in  recessions  and  the  average  length  of 
unemployment  spells  typically  lengthens  during  the  course  of  a  recession  until  job 
creation resumes.
9 Two versions of the ratio of duration to unemployment are used. The 
first  version  is  the  one-quarter  lag  of  ratio  of  duration  in  weeks  at  time  t  to  the 
unemployment rate lagged by two quarters (DURRAT), reflecting that duration lags the 
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unemployment rate by two quarters.  The second is the smoothed version of the first 
using  a  Hodrick-Prescott  filter  (DURRATHP,  q=1600).    The  first  version  is  the  one-
quarter lag of ratio of duration in weeks at time t to the unemployment rate lagged by two 
quarters (DURRAT), reflecting that duration lags the unemployment rate by two quarters.   
The main advantage of  DURRAT relative to DURRATHP is that the marginal 
information in duration may be better identified because short-run movements in duration 
are better captured in DURRAT. The disadvantage of DURRAT is that it is noisier than 
DURRATHP  since  DURRAT  displays  some  short-term  swings  that  follow  short-run 
changes in unemployment. Consequently, DURRAT yields noisier NAIRU estimates than 
does DURRATHP. 
The unemployment rate and the average length of duration used as variables or in 
the  construction  of  variables  are  adjusted  for  the  1994  changes  in  the  household 
employment survey.  Pre-1994 levels of the unemployment rate are adjusted upward by a 
multiplicative factor of 1.009 and average duration is adjusted upward by a multiplicative 
factor according to estimates based on overlapping data by Polivka and Miller (1998).
10    
  Two  approaches  are  used  to  control  for  demographic  shifts.    First,  in  some 
regressions which use the overall unemployment rate, the proportion of the labor force 35 
years or older is added as an explanatory variable.  Second, we replace the non-interacted 
unemployment rate with a demographically adjusted rate using a procedure similar to that 
of Shimer (1998, 2001).  In particular, our demographically adjusted unemployment rate 
equals the weighted average sum of the unemployment rate of different age groups at 
time t multiplied by each group’ s share of the labor force during all of 1980.
11   
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Regression Results 
Regression  results  for  core  PCE  and  nominal  wage  inflation  are  presented  in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively.  In each table, two sets of regressions are presented.  In the 
first  set,  there  are  six  models  using  the  unemployment  rate,  with  the  baseline  model 
shown in column 1 and with models 2 and 3 adding the duration-unemployment ratio 
(DURRAT)  and  the  demographic  ratio  (AGE35+)  to  the  baseline  model,  respectively.  
Model  4  adds  both  variables  to  the  baseline  model,  while  models  5  and  6  replace 
DURRAT in models 2 and 4 with DURRATHP. The second set of models replaces the 
non-interactive unemployment rate with the demographically adjusted rate, with models 
7 and 8 corresponding to models 1 and 2.  Owing to the use of 12 lags of inflation and the 
availability of core PCE and non-farm wage data since 1959, regressions are estimated 
over a common sample of 1962:q2-2005:q4. Consistent with the NAIRU approach, the 
constants and coefficients on the level of unemployment are statistically significant. The 
energy  variable  is  statistically  significant  in  most  core  PCE  inflation  models,  but  is 
insignificant in each wage model, consistent with the plausible case that opposing effects 
of energy shocks on labor supply and demand may result in an ambiguous net effect of 
energy  shocks  on  wage  inflation.    Medium-run  productivity  growth  and  the  variable 
controlling for stock options are statistically significant in each nominal wage regression. 
  Several  notable  patterns  emerge  across  the  tables.  First,  the  duration-
unemployment ratio, DURRAT, is always at least marginally statistically significant in 
the core PCE and wage models, while the ratio smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott filter is 
not significant in the presence of the even less significant AGE35+ variable.  Second, 
with respect to the core PCE models, the separate demographic variable (AGE35+) is 
significant only in the absence of the duration ratio (models 3 versus 4 and 6 in Table 3),  
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whereas the unsmoothed duration ratio is significant, albeit to a lesser degree, in the 
presence of AGE35+.   In the wage models, the duration ratios are still, albeit to a lesser 
extent, statistically significant in the presence of AGE35+, which is not significant in the 
presence of either duration variable. Third, in models using the demographically-adjusted 
unemployment rate, the duration ratio is significant in regressions of core PCE and non-
farm  wage  (model  8  in  Tables  3  and  4).      Fourth,  across  corresponding  models,  the 
duration ratio (DURRAT) has a smaller t-statistic in the presence of AGE35+ (models 2 
versus 4 in each table) or in models using the demographically adjusted unemployment 
rate (models 2 versus 8 in each table).  This pattern plausibly reflects that movements in 
the duration ratio reflect demographic trends and other factors (e.g., shifts in hiring or 
firing  behavior),  consistent  with  the  simulation  results.    Fifth,  in  the  price  inflation 
models 2-6 the coefficients and variable values imply that the NAIRU was between 4.3 
and 5.0 percent in 2005:Q4, well below the baseline model 1 estimate of 5.84 percent.  
NAIRU estimates from the DURRAT and DURRATHP models imply that the NAIRU fell 
sharply in the 1990s, in contrast to the fixed, baseline model estimate (Figure 7).   
Sixth, this pattern arises using the demographically adjusted unemployment rate, 
with the NAIRU estimate from baseline price model (model 7, Table 3) at 6.2 percent 
and that from the duration model (model 8) at a lower 5.3 in 2005:Q4.  [In 2005:Q4, the 
demographically adjusted rate, 5.8, exceeded the official rate of 5.0%.] Seventh, there is 
evidence of short-term serial correlation in residuals in wage models that omit either the 
duration  or  AGE35+  variables,  suggesting  that  the  standard  models  (model  1)  or  the 
simple  demographically  adjusted  unemployment  model  (model  7)  are  miss-specified.  
Finally, using the overall unemployment rate, the NAIRUs at the end of 2005 from the  
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wage equations (models 2-6) were notably lower when the duration ratio is included, in a 
range between 4.8 to 5.2 percent, versus 7.6 percent in the baseline model (model 1).   
The improved performance of NAIRU models when adding this ratio parallels the 
simulation model results in an important aspect.  In particular, demographic shifts could 
only  partially  account  for  the  rise  of  the  observed  duration  ratio  in  the  1990s  in  the 
simulation models, which implied a possible role for other factors, such as lower job 
security  arising  from  shifts  in  the  labor  hiring  or  firing  functions.  This  finding  is 
consistent  with  the  greater  significance  of  the  duration  ratio  than  the  demographic 
variable in the NAIRU models of price inflation.  Also noteworthy, is that calibration 
experiments yield NAIRU and duration ratio estimates that are reasonably similar to the 
observed duration ratio (recall Figure 5) and the NAIRU results implied by the duration-
modified model (model 2) of core PCE inflation (compare Figures 6 and 7).  
IV. Conclusion 
Since the mid 1980s, two major macro-labor indicators have shifted substantially, 
with the natural unemployment rate falling and the ratio of duration to the unemployment 
rate  rising.    Our  simulation  and  regression  results  attribute  these  developments  to  a 
combination of the aging of the baby boom generation and a decline in job turnover, the 
latter  of  which  may  plausibly  stem  from  decreased  job  security.    By  using  both 
approaches, we test the internal and external consistency of the view that both factors 
have played important roles.  In addition, other evidence suggests that declines in job 
turnover stemming from reduced voluntary quits may have been induced by increased job 
insecurity, consistent with survey data on worker perceptions of job insecurity and a 
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Figure 7: In Core PCE Models, the NAIRU Varies with Duration 
percent
Standard Fixed NAIRU Model
DURRATHP controls for the lead of unemployment over duration by equaling the ratio of average duration in quarter t o the time t-2 
unemployment rate., using data adjusted for the 1994 survey break and run through a Hodrick-Prescott filter.  DURRAT controls for the lead of 
unemployment over duration by equaling the ratio of average duration in quarter t to the unemployment rate at time t-2. Sources: Bureau of 
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Figure 8: In Compensation Models, the NAIRU Varies with Duration
percent
Standard Fixed NAIRU Model
DURRATHP controls for the lead of unemployment over duration by equaling the ratio of average duration in quarter t o the time t-2 
unemployment rate., using data adjusted for the 1994 survey break and run through a Hodrick-Prescott filter.  DURRAT controls for the lead of 
unemployment over duration by equaling the ratio of average duration in quarter t to the unemployment rate at time t-2. Sources: Bureau of Labor 
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More specifically, in a calibration model based on an efficiency wage framework, 
the combination of an aging labor force and a fall in the number of workers leaving their 
jobs (due to greater insecurity) could account for the combination of the higher duration 
ratio and the lower NAIRU estimates observed since the late-1980s. As in Shimer (1998, 
2001),  we  find  that  shifting  demographics  play  an  important  role,  but  we  argue,  in 
contrast, that demographics are not sufficient to fully account for changes in the NAIRU.  
In this respect, our simulation and estimation results are consistent with those of Valletta 
(1999),  who  found  that  the  firing-to-quit  ratio  has  risen  at  a  given  level  of  the 
unemployment rate since the late-1980s, and accord with widespread anecdotal reports, 
Challenger data on layoffs, and survey evidence indicating that job security has declined.  
Our results are also consistent with Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001), who found that 
demographic factors could not account for the apparent post-1992 decline in the NAIRU. 
In  line  with  our  calibration  results,  the  duration-unemployment  ratio  is  highly 
significant in expectations-augmented Phillips curve models of price and wage inflation.  
Furthermore, regression results imply a sizable decline in the NAIRU during the 1990s, 
when  traditional,  time  invariant  NAIRU  models  broke  down.  Although  our  findings 
mainly provide an explanation for the poor performance of traditional NAIRU models in 
the 1990s, they also imply that marginal information might be gleaned from monitoring 
the duration of unemployment relative to the unemployment rate.  Nevertheless, caution 
should be exercised in using the duration ratio as an additional indicator, since simulation 
results indicate that the duration ratio may not always move in lock step with the NAIRU. 
In addition to the NAIRU results, although the ratio of duration to unemployment 
was also high in the 1950s and early 1960s before the baby boomers entered the labor 
force, much of the rise since the late 1980s appears to be linked to factors other than  
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demographics.  As shown earlier in Figure 3, additional evidence favoring a role for non-
demographic  factors  is  that  the  ratio  of  the  mean  duration  of  unemployment  to  the 
unemployment rate has risen by more than what is implied by historical relationships 
with the demographic composition of the labor force.  
By drawing on both calibration and estimation techniques, our findings provide an 
internally and externally consistent explanation for the behavior of the duration ratio and 
an apparent decline in the NAIRU.  In particular, results imply that the unemployment 
rate—with or without demographic adjustments—is not as useful an indicator of labor 
market slack because changes in labor practices can alter job turnover and job security in 
ways not fully or consistently reflected in the unemployment rate.
12 In this respect, our 
regression  and  simulation  results  are  consistent  with  Milton  Friedman’s  (1968,  p.8) 
characterization  of  the  “natural  rate  of  unemployment”  as,  “not  immutable  and 
unchangeable. On the contrary, many of the market characteristics that determine its level 
are man-made and policy-made.”  
Nevertheless, duration can reflect extra information about job security in plausible 
general equilibrium simulation models, and in NAIRU models of inflation, duration has 
provided statistically and economically important information beyond that contained in 
the overall or demographically- adjusted unemployment rates.  With Friedman’s caveat in 
mind, additional information regarding the degree in labor market slack may be gleaned 
from monitoring relative movements in duration.  Other changes in labor practices since 
the 1990s could further alter these relationships.  For example, future extensions of our 
study  could  examine  how  intra-  and  inter-national  outsourcing  of  services  will  affect 
measures of unemployment slack and their relationship to inflation.   
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In interpreting the labor markets of the last two decades, a combination of high 
unemployment and low job security temporarily gave rise to the “traumatized worker
13” 
and unexpectedly large disinflation of the early 1990s, after which a still elevated 
perception of job insecurity accompanied low unemployment rates during the long boom 
of the 1990s and the weak economy of the early 2000s (consistent with Figure 2 and 
Valletta, 1999).  A long-lasting shift in labor market practices has apparently allowed the 
economy to operate at lower overall unemployment rates nearer to 5 percent rather than 
to 6 percent.  Indeed, there was only a mild acceleration in inflation when unemployment 
fell below 4.5 percent in the late 1990s, followed by a notable deceleration during the 
slow economy of the early 2000s when unemployment remained below 6.5%. For these 
reasons, after being temporarily “traumatized” in the early 1990s, workers appear to have 
remained “chastened” as evolving labor practices continued to threaten job security and 
deter them from seeking other jobs.  
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Table 1: Simulated and Actual Values of the Natural Rate and the Duration-Unemployment 











1960  15.76  5.43  5.5  2.9  2.73 
1961  15.76  5.45  5.51  2.89  2.71 
1962  15.76  5.47  5.51  2.88  2.73 
1963  15.73  5.52  5.55  2.85  2.78 
1964  15.69  5.59  5.6  2.81  2.75 
1965  15.63  5.67  5.68  2.76  2.75 
1966  15.57  5.76  5.76  2.7  2.96 
1967  15.52  5.81  5.78  2.67  2.77 
1968  15.49  5.83  5.79  2.66  2.72 
1969  15.43  5.91  5.84  2.61  2.8 
1970  15.36  5.97  5.9  2.57  2.59 
1971  15.3  6.03  5.94  2.53  2.31 
1972  15.19  6.13  6.04  2.48  2.35 
1973  15.09  6.23  6.13  2.42  2.27 
1974  15.04  6.26  6.17  2.4  2.32 
1975  15.01  6.27  6.17  2.39  2.22 
1976  14.97  6.32  6.2  2.37  2.19 
1977  14.93  6.36  6.24  2.35  2.14 
1978  14.91  6.39  6.27  2.34  2.13 
1979  14.91  6.39  6.25  2.33  2.15 
1980  14.92  6.37  6.22  2.34  2.17 
1981  14.94  6.33  6.17  2.36  2.09 
1982  14.98  6.28  6.12  2.39  2.07 
1983  15.01  6.25  6.08  2.4  2.12 
1984  15.04  6.21  6.04  2.42  2.39 
1985  15.08  6.17  6.02  2.44  2.37 
1986  15.12  6.13  5.99  2.47  2.37 
1987  15.17  6.09  5.97  2.49  2.44 
1988  15.23  6.05  5.93  2.52  2.64 
1989  15.18  6.07  5.9  2.5  2.57 
1990  15.32  6  5.87  2.55  2.58 
1991  15.39  5.94  5.78  2.59  2.45 
1992  15.45  5.91  5.66  2.62  2.69 
1993  15.51  5.88  5.53  2.64  2.69 
1994  15.56  5.87  5.4  2.65  2.83 
1995  15.6  5.85  5.29  2.67  2.92 
1996  15.67  5.81  5.19  2.7  3 
1997  15.71  5.8  5.12  2.71  3.04 
1998  15.73  5.81  5.07  2.71  3.12 
1999  15.76  5.82  5.03  2.71  3.06 
2000  15.79  5.8  5.01  2.72  3.12 
2001  15.83  5.78  5  2.74  3.17 
2002  15.86  5.76  5  2.75  3.06 
2003  15.91  5.74  5  2.77  3.26 
2004  15.92  5.73  5  2.78  3.39 
2005  15.94  5.71  5  2.79  3.47  
 
 
  30 
 
Table 2: Simulated and Actual Values of the Natural Rate and Duration-










Actual   
Ratio 
1960  15.76  5.43  5.5  2.9  2.73 
1961  15.76  5.45  5.51  2.89  2.71 
1962  15.76  5.47  5.51  2.88  2.73 
1963  15.73  5.52  5.55  2.85  2.78 
1964  15.69  5.59  5.6  2.81  2.75 
1965  15.63  5.67  5.68  2.76  2.75 
1966  15.57  5.76  5.76  2.7  2.96 
1967  15.52  5.81  5.78  2.67  2.77 
1968  15.49  5.83  5.79  2.66  2.72 
1969  15.43  5.91  5.84  2.61  2.8 
1970  15.36  5.97  5.9  2.57  2.59 
1971  15.3  6.03  5.94  2.53  2.31 
1972  15.19  6.13  6.04  2.48  2.35 
1973  15.09  6.23  6.13  2.42  2.27 
1974  15.04  6.26  6.17  2.4  2.32 
1975  15.01  6.27  6.17  2.39  2.22 
1976  14.97  6.32  6.2  2.37  2.19 
1977  14.93  6.36  6.24  2.35  2.14 
1978  14.91  6.39  6.27  2.34  2.13 
1979  14.91  6.39  6.25  2.33  2.15 
1980  14.92  6.37  6.22  2.34  2.17 
1981  14.94  6.33  6.17  2.36  2.09 
1982  14.98  6.28  6.12  2.39  2.07 
1983  15.01  6.25  6.08  2.4  2.12 
1984  15.04  6.21  6.04  2.42  2.39 
1985  15.08  6.17  6.02  2.44  2.37 
1986  15.12  6.13  5.99  2.47  2.37 
1987  15.17  6.09  5.97  2.49  2.44 
1988  15.23  6.05  5.93  2.52  2.64 
1989  15.18  6.07  5.9  2.5  2.57 
1990  15.32  6  5.87  2.55  2.58 
1991  15.39  5.94  5.78  2.59  2.45 
1992  15.45  5.8  5.66  2.67  2.69 
1993  15.5  5.66  5.53  2.74  2.69 
1994  15.55  5.55  5.4  2.81  2.83 
1995  15.59  5.41  5.29  2.88  2.92 
1996  15.66  5.27  5.19  2.97  3 
1997  15.7  5.15  5.12  3.05  3.04 
1998  15.72  5.16  5.07  3.05  3.12 
1999  15.75  5.17  5.03  3.05  3.06 
2000  15.78  5.15  5.01  3.06  3.12 
2001  15.82  5.13  5  3.08  3.17 
2002  15.85  5.12  5  3.1  3.06 
2003  15.9  5.09  5  3.12  3.26 
2004  15.91  5.08  5  3.13  3.39 
2005  15.93  5.07  5  3.14  3.47  
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Table 3: Core PCE Inflation Regressions with Real Ex. Rate, Sample: 1962:Q2-2005:Q4
1 
 
                Overall Civilian Unemployment Rate               Demo. Adj. Unemp. Rate
#     
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
constant   
 0.0032 





*   0.0039
**   0.0069
* 
     (4.81)    (4.57)   (3.30)    (2.59)    (4.27)    (2.55)     (5.38)    (4.23) 
 




















      (-2.95)  (-3.47)   (-2.96)   (-3.38)   (-3.27)   (-3.18)    (-3.08)   (-3.36) 
 
NIXOFFt     0.0110





**   0.0109
**   0.0104
** 
     (7.21)    (7.19)     (7.16)     (7.17)     (7.12)     (7.10)     (7.28)    (6.97)   
 
ENERGYt    -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0003   -0.0002   -0.0001  -0.0001   -0.0003   -0.0004 











      (-2.26)  (-2.24)   (-1.84)   (-2.17)   (-2.16)   (-2.05)    (-2.32)   (-2.07) 
 
DURRATt-1 
    -0.0014
**      -0.0014
+              -0.0008
* 
          (-3.01)      (-1.89)               (-2.03)  
 
DURRATHPt-1
                -0.0013
**  -0.0012 
                      (-2.71)   (-1.40)  
 
AGE35+t-1 
        -0.00010
*  0.000001
      -0.0001 
              (-2.31)  (0.01)        (-0.18)           
NAIRU, 05:Q4 5.84%    4.39%    4.99%    5.08%    4.39%    4.44%    6.22%
#   5.29%
# 
LM(1)    1.03      1.61      1.46      1.79      1.97      1.94      1.71      1.97 
LM(2)    1.50      1.81      1.68      1.81      2.04      2.02
      1.82      1.99 
q(24)    19.14    15.57    15.76    15.58    16.33    16.14    17.88    16.88 
R
2    .8854    .8910    .8885    .8902    .8898    .8892    .8889    .8911 
1. Sums of coefficients for lags of inflation not reported as the sum is constrained to = 1.
 *(
**,
+): significant at the 5% (1%, 10%) level.   
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Table 4: Nominal Wage Inflation Regressions With Real Ex. Rate (NonFarm Business Sector), Sample: 1962:Q2-2005:Q4
1 
                          Overall Civilian Unemployment Rate             Demo.-Adj. Unemployment
#   
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
constant     0.0124
**   0.0269
**  0.0363
**   0.0278
**   0.0271
**   0.0269
**   0.0145
**   0.0229
** 
     (6.35)    (8.27)   (5.94)     (4.29)  
   (8.10)    (4.02) 
   (7.49)    (7.93)  
 









     (-6.39)   (-8.49)   (-7.84)   (-7.41)   (-8.42)   (-7.20)   (-7.58)   (-8.48)  
     
NIXONt  -0.0042
  -0.0060






     (-1.57)   (-2.41)   (-1.44)   (-2.29)   (-2.13)   (-2.09)   (-1.75)   (-2.28) 
 
NIXOFFt     0.0067
*   0.0060
*  0.0065
*   0.0060
*    0.0059
*   0.0059
*   0.0067
*    0.0058
*  
     (2.21)    (2.12)   (2.25)     (2.12)     (2.08)    (2.08)     (2.31)    (2.07) 
 
ENERGYt     0.0009    0.0013  0.0013    0.0013   0.0018    0.0018    0.0010    0.0013 
      (0.34)    (0.37)   (0.50)     (0.53)     (0.72)     (0.72)     (0.40)     (0.54) 
 
PROD12t-1   0.0008
*   0.0014
**   0.0016
**   0.0014
**   0.0014
**   0.0014
**   0.0008
**   0.0013
** 
     (2.49)     (4.24)     (4.42)     (3.74)     (4.25)     (3.64)     (2.72)     (4.08) 
 
DURRATt-1 
    -0.0047
**      -0.0046
* 
            -0.0031
**    
        (-5.36)       (-3.26)               (-3.79) 
DURRATHPt-1
                -0.0049
**  -0.0049
** 
                      (-5.23)   (-3.05)  
AGE35+t-1 
        -0.0004
**  -0.00002      -0.00006   
   
            (-4.11)   (-0.16)       (-0.04) 
￿RER8Qt-2  -0.0062
  -0.0053  -0.0026  -0.0052  -0.0048
  -0.0049  -0.0064
  -0.0057 
     (-1.55)   (-1.44)   (-0.67)   (-1.33)   (-1.30)   (-1.25)   (-1.65)   (-1.53)  
 
PROFSHAR t   0.8887
**   0.9367
**  0.8912
**   0.9351
**   0.9351
**   0.9355
**   0.8926
**   0.9335
** 
     (12.36)   (14.01)  (13.01)    (13.79) 
   (13.93)   (13.70)
   (12.97)   (13.95)    
NAIRU, 05:Q4  7.65%    4.87%    5.17%    4.85%    4.76%    4.76%     7.77%
#    5.88%
# 
LM(1)     7.66
**     1.00      2.54      1.00
      1.31      1.32      3.65
+     0.97 
LM(2)   10.84
**     1.19      3.24      1.20
      1.54      1.56      5.02
+     1.20   
q(24)    49.12
**   30.19    27.41    30.09    30.33    30.37    33.85
    31.12 
R
2    .7360    .7758    .7604    .7744    .7756    .7743    .7565    .7757 
1. Sums of coefficients for lags of inflation not reported as the sum is constrained to = 1.
 *(
**,
+): significant at the 5% (1%, 10%) level. Endnotes 
                                                            
1 While the probability of hire should be related to the total separation rate into nonemployment (including 
both unemployment and out of the labor force), the hiring probability can be expressed as a function of q if 
the proportion of separations that are into unemployment (relative to total separations into nonemployment) 
remains relatively constant over time.  The probability of hire can be expressed as a function either of 
separations into unemployment or of total separations into nonemployment.  The choice to express the 
hiring probability as a function of the probability of separation into unemployment is made for expositional 
convenience.  
 
2 If an individual moves directly from one employer to another employer, the number of vacancies in the 
aggregate economy is not affected, so separations that occur because of job changes do not affect the 
probability of hire.  
 
3 Monthly separation rates are calculated from the equation 
35 . 4 ) 1 ( 1 q - - , since there are, on average, 4.35 
weeks per month.  
 
4 This value of  q, the probability of a separation into unemployment, is somewhat higher than the value 
estimated by Blanchard and Diamond (1990), who used data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), as 
adjusted by Abowd and Zellner (1985). According to Blanchard and Diamond, transitions between 
employment and unemployment averaged 1.29% of employment on a monthly basis. However, the figure 
reported in Blanchard and Diamond omits those who are separated from their jobs in one month, 
experience a short spell of unemployment, and are rehired before the next month’s survey.  
 
5 These data are available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~shimer/data/flows/sep.dat. 
 
6 NIXON equals 1 during the first two quarters of price controls (1971:3-71:4) and 0, otherwise, while 
NIXOFF equals 1 during the first two quarters when price controls were no longer in effect (1974:2-74:3).  
These variables differ slightly from those of Gordon (1977), which were less statistically significant and 
whose inclusion did not eliminate serially correlated errors in many similar (mainly baseline) regressions.     
 
7 Results were similar using the core CPI, but some of the post-1994 drop in the NAIRU derived from CPI 
regressions may be an artifact of changes in CPI measurement methodology designed to reduce bias. 
  
8 Overall prices outperformed PCE prices reflecting that firms pay the marginal product of labor 
(productivity plus wages deflated by output prices) in the long-run (pp. 147-49 and 151, Economic Report 
of the President, 1997). A productivity variable (PROD12) was added in order for the wage equations to be 
well-behaved, as in Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001). The span of the productivity term mirrors the 12 
quarterly inflation lags without unduly reducing the degrees of freedom by including 12 noisy lags of 
quarterly productivity growth.    
 
9 This is consistent with the classification of the unemployment rate as a coincident economic indicator and 
the duration of unemployment as a lagging indicator by the Conference Board. 
  
10 To construct a multiplicative adjustment similar to that for the unemployment rate, we multiplied pre-
1994 data by the ratio of average duration for new survey technique to the old (17.19/14.96) using figures 
computed by Miller and Polivka (1998). 
  
11 We could not construct a demographically-adjusted duration ratio because age-specific duration data are 
unavailable.  The duration ratio tests whether duration adds marginal information aside from demographics.  
 
12 Indeed, after noting that many unemployed workers exhausted their unemployment benefits in early 
2004, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (2004) testified to Congress that: “Moreover, the average 
duration of unemployment increased from twelve weeks in September 2000 to twenty weeks in March of 
this [2004] year.  These developments have led to a notable rise in insecurity among workers.”  
 
 
  1 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 A coinage attributed to Alan Greenspan [see Woodward (2000, pp.168-69)].  